This is a review ofFiscal Federalism and Tax Effort in the U.S. States. Nicholson-Crotty, Sean. 2008. State Politics and Policy Quarterly 8 (summer): 109-126. Find in Google Scholar
Putting it all together, Nicholson-Crotty is telling us that federal grants-in-aid are little more than a redistribution of the income tax burden from liberal states to conservative ones.
The federal government gives billions of dollars to the 50 state governments as grants-in-aid, whether to fund schools, Medicaid, or whatever. The idea is this: The federal government gives states extra money so that they will increase spending in a particular area without having to cut spending elsewhere. But is that what really happens?
Nicholson-Crotty presents evidence that it does not. Instead, he finds that states (indirectly) refund a significant proportion of federal funds to state taxpayers. When states receive money from the federal government, they use it to reduce state tax rates.
More precisely, Nicholson-Crotty finds that an increase in grant monies (X) leads to a decrease in the state’s taxation effort (Y), a measure (from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations) of the state’s effective tax rate relative to the amount of money the state government could (hypothetically) tax. As X goes up, Y goes down.
This doesn’t mean that states don’t spend the money the way Congress wanted it spent. But it does mean that the states are cutting their own spending in the particular area, and possibly in other areas, keeping the state’s overall spending somewhat constant despite the influx of federal funds.
Now, this relationship isn’t perfect. Nicholson-Crotty considers three factors that might affect Read More »
This is a review ofIs Voting Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments. Nickerson, David W. 2008. American Political Science Review 102 (February): 49-57. Find in Google Scholar
This “contagion effect” has a stronger effect on turnout than education, income, or age.
Nowhere will you find a human relationship associated with more similarities in voting behavior than you will find between a husband and wife. But what causes husbands and wives to embrace similar ideologies, issue positions, and turnout rates? Maybe it’s just that we seek out politically similar dating partners. Maybe it’s that husbands and wives share the same political experiences over time.
The trouble is, it is difficult to prove empirically whether voting is contagious. To do so requires somehow controlling for selection effects and other outside factors. In the article reviewed here, Nickerson reports on an innovative experiment that does just that. Ahead of the September 10th, 2002, Congressional primaries in Denver and Minneapolis, Read More »
Suppose that the government made a habit of sending your neighbors a letter after every election, telling them whether or not you had bothered to vote. Would you be more likely to turn out?
Suppose that the government made a habit of sending your neighbors a letter after every election, telling them whether or not you had bothered to vote. Would you be more likely to turn out? Odds are that you would. At least, that’s the conclusion of a massive experiment likely to change the way campaigns mobilize voters.
In an article by Gerber, Green, and Larimer, these three political scientists report the result of a large-scale randomized experiment involving 180,000 Michigan voters.1 You may not know it, but several states (including Michigan) make it a matter of public record whether or not you vote. Anybody willing to pay a small access fee can have a list of registered voters, including names, addresses, and turnout information.2
Once you’ve got this information, designing an experiment is easy. First, find out who has voted in recent elections and who hasn’t. Then, apply some sort of treatment to a randomly selected group of these people. Finally, observe turnout in a future election and see whether the treated group Read More »
This is a review ofVote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot. Nichter, Simeon. 2008. American Political Science Review 102 (February): 19-31. Find in Google Scholar
Suppose that the Republicans started knocking doors on your street offering you and your neighbors a new flatscreen television if you come out and vote for their candidates in the next election. Or suppose that the Democrats offered you “street money,” a direct cash payment in exchange for coming out to vote for them. How would you feel?
As Nichter points out, these two situations are far from hypothetical. These efforts to buy the vote happen occasionally in the United States,1 but frequently in other countries–such as Argentina, the focus of this study.
But Nichter asks us to reconsider what’s happening here. When we observe these behaviors, are we observing “vote buying” (as we usually assume) or “turnout buying”? The question isn’t merely academic; “vote buying” smacks of corruption, but “turnout buying” looks more like mobilization, a (usually) laudable activity.
Nichter’s central claim is that parties engage primarily in turnout buying, not vote buying (although they may engage in both, to some extent). Rather than try to purchase support from moderately opposed voters, parties try to encourage non-voting supporters to turn out. Read More »
In every case, he was startlingly correct; as predicted, the nation’s ideological mood reversed about every 15 years.
In 1924, Arthur Schlesinger famously predicted that “Coolidge-style conservatism would last till about 1932.” Later, he added that the “prevailing liberal mood would run its course in about 1947.” In 1949, he predicted once again that “the recession from liberalism was due to end in 1962,” and that the “next conservative epoch will commence around 1978.” In every case, he was startlingly correct; as predicted, the nation’s ideological mood reversed about every 15 years.1
Schlesinger’s feat inspires the present study. The authors argue that there are cycles in American ideology. Roughly every 12 to 15 years since 1854, American voters have oscillated between preferring Democrats or Republicans in national office, with a complete cycle every 25 to 30 years. Read More »
The public wouldn’t get the policies it wants; it would get the policies it was duped into wanting.
In a democracy, politicians and policy outcomes should be responsive to changes in public opinion. But what if politicians (or others, such as media commentators) were able to manipulate public opinion through propaganda or other, more subtle methods? We might appear on the surface to have democracy, but it would be a farce. The public wouldn’t get the policies it wants; it would get the policies it was duped into wanting.
Political scientists have fretted over that possibility for decades. The first major findings found that mass media had “minimal effects” on public opinion.1 More recently, scholars have found that political communications can influence opinion in a few ways. Of particular importance for this study, some scholars have reported that politicians and mass media can influence public opinion by choosing how to frame a story. Is protecting rainforests about indigenous rights or environmental concerns?2 Are urban growth limits about protecting greenbelts or attracting greenbacks?3
Chong and Druckman’s argument, in essence, is that previous studies have used methodologies that exaggerate the real-world importance of framing. Overwhelmingly, previous experiments have tested the effect of exposing people to a single frame (on one side of the issue) or none at all (the control group). These studies have found strong framing effects.
By contrast, Chong and Druckman develop two frames–one strong, one weak–on each side of their chosen issues, for a total of four frames. Read More »
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