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	<title>Abstract Politics &#187; Search Results  &#187;  Druckman James N</title>
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	<description>Reviewing the latest research in political science</description>
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		<title>Campaign Communications in U.S. Congressional Elections</title>
		<link>http://abstractpolitics.com/2009/09/campaign-communications-in-u-s-congressional-elections/</link>
		<comments>http://abstractpolitics.com/2009/09/campaign-communications-in-u-s-congressional-elections/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2009 19:13:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Adam Brown</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[American Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[campaign advertising]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[congressional elections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[incumbency advantage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[low-information rationality]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[media and politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[minimal effects]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[partisanship]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[voting and elections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[websites blogs and new media]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://abstractpolitics.com/?p=121</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[We&#8217;ve long known that most voters pay little attention to campaign rhetoric; they pay far more attention to partisanship, incumbency, and other easily accessible considerations (although rhetoric certainly has its place). Still, candidates work hard to develop arguments that, they hope, will sway voters to their side. The question: How do candidates decide what to [...]]]></description>
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<p>We&#8217;ve long known that most voters pay little attention to campaign rhetoric; they pay far more attention to partisanship, incumbency, and other easily accessible considerations (although rhetoric certainly has its place).<sup class="footnote"><small><a href="http://abstractpolitics.com/2009/09/campaign-communications-in-u-s-congressional-elections/#cite-1" name="cite-1" title="See Iyengar and Kinder (1987), Zaller (1992), and, for the original &#8220;minimal effects&#8221; claim, Berelson et al. (1954).">1</a></small></sup> Still, candidates work hard to develop arguments that, they hope, will sway voters to their side.</p>
<p>The question: How do candidates decide what to emphasize in their campaign communications? When do they go negative? When do they stick to the issues? When do they emphasize their experience and community ties? And given how many thousands of campaigns are run around this country each election cycle, how can we possible study all this?</p>
<p>There has been some previous work on this question, but most of it has looked at television ads or media coverage. Both sources have flaws. Television ads and media coverage are more common in the most competitive races, since safe incumbents don&#8217;t spend money on ads. They are also more common in Senate races than House races. How, then, can we use television ads to see how rhetoric is different in competitive races or in House races than in other races?</p>
<p>In a recent article, Druckman et al. avoid these problems by looking instead at rhetoric in Congressional campaign websites in 2002, 2004, and 2006. Although not all candidates had websites in 2002, by 2004 and 2006 just about every major-party Congressional candidate had a website. And what do we learn?<span id="more-121"></span></p>
<h3>Findings</h3>
<ul>
<li>Challengers are far more likely than incumbents to use negative attacks (whether personal attacks or issue contrasts) than incumbents.</li>
<li>Challengers are more likely than incumbents to use &#8220;Web 2.0&#8243; technologies that enable visitors to create content (e.g. via commenting on the site).</li>
<li>Challengers are more likely than incumbents to stress their party affiliation and to bring up issues that their party &#8220;owns,&#8221; particularly if the incumbent is not a member of the district&#8217;s majority party.<sup class="footnote"><small><a href="http://abstractpolitics.com/2009/09/campaign-communications-in-u-s-congressional-elections/#cite-2" name="cite-2" title="More on issue ownership.">2</a></small></sup></li>
<li>Incumbents are more likely than challengers to emphasize their experience, their long history in the district, and the specific benefits (pork) they have provided to the district. This is especially true in hotly contested districts; elsewhere, incumbents are unlikely to put much effort at all into their websites.</li>
</ul>
<h3>Theory</h3>
<p>Druckman and his colleagues tell a compelling story to explain these findings. Briefly, and with considerable re-interpretation by me:</p>
<ul>
<li><em>Going negative and enabling interactive Web 2.0 technologies are risky</em>. Since incumbents enjoy significant electoral advantages<sup class="footnote"><small><a href="http://abstractpolitics.com/2009/09/campaign-communications-in-u-s-congressional-elections/#cite-3" name="cite-3" title="Mayhew (1974), Jacobson (1987), Cox and Katz (1996), Carson et al (2007) (also Carson et al), etc.">3</a></small></sup>, they feel no need to take on these risks. But challengers seeking to overcome these advantages may find these risks worth taking. Thus, challengers are more likely to pepper their sites with negative comments and also to provide forums, wikis, or commenting interfaces.</li>
<li><em>Partisanship is often as valuable a cue to voters as incumbency</em>. Thus, challengers make a partisan case against incumbents who belong to the district&#8217;s minority party.</li>
<li><em>Incumbents want to do what they can to strengthen their incumbency advantage</em>. Thus, an emphasis on talking about things that only incumbents have (experience, <a href="http://wikisum.com/w/Mayhew:_Congress">credit claiming</a> opportunities, etc).</li>
</ul>
<h3>Importance</h3>
<p>The authors&#8217; biggest contribution is their thorough, thoughtful, and insightful use of campaign websites. This data source allows for a near-universal (especially after 2002), unfiltered look at what candidates want voters to hear. And this method does, indeed, yield different results than we would find if the authors had relied on more traditional data sources, such as TV ads or media coverage. When the authors restrict their analysis to those races that had significant ad buys or media coverage, many of their important results disappear into statistical oblivion. The authors have identified a cheap, easy way to capture a fuller sample of current campaign messages.</p>
<h3>Quibbles and parting jabs</h3>
<p>I like this article, but the authors need to be careful not to oversell their contribution.<sup class="footnote"><small><a href="http://abstractpolitics.com/2009/09/campaign-communications-in-u-s-congressional-elections/#cite-4" name="cite-4" title="Isn&#8217;t that always true, though? Danged tenure pressure.">4</a></small></sup> Reliance on websites as a true measure of what messages campaigns are actually pushing may not be as much a panacea as claimed.</p>
<p><em>First: Who reads campaign websites?</em> The authors use a survey of campaign web developers to show who, in the developers&#8217; minds, reads the websites. Even the developers concede that the main target audience&#8211;swing voters&#8211;is the least likely of all to actually visit the site. But remember that the web developers probably dramatically overestimate the importance of their product. How else would they sell their services? Consider the websites of two prominent members of Congress: <a href="http://www.ericcantor.com/">Eric Cantor (Republican Whip)</a> and <a href="http://www.clyburnforcongress.com/">Jim Clyburn (Democratic Whip)</a>.<sup class="footnote"><small><a href="http://abstractpolitics.com/2009/09/campaign-communications-in-u-s-congressional-elections/#cite-5" name="cite-5" title="I choose these two because they are prominent enough to attract more attention than most members, but not as polarizingly well known as higher chamber leaders.">5</a></small></sup> <a href="http://www.alexa.com/">Alexa.com</a> is a free service that tracks how many people view websites.<sup class="footnote"><small><a href="http://abstractpolitics.com/2009/09/campaign-communications-in-u-s-congressional-elections/#cite-6" name="cite-6" title="Yes, Alexa is deeply, deeply flawed, but bear with me.">6</a></small></sup> Alexa reports that so few people visit Cantor&#8217;s (<a href="http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/www.ericcantor.com">report</a>) and Clyburn&#8217;s (<a href="http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/www.clyburnforcongress.com">report</a>) sites that it can&#8217;t even provide an estimate of their reach.<sup class="footnote"><small><a href="http://abstractpolitics.com/2009/09/campaign-communications-in-u-s-congressional-elections/#cite-7" name="cite-7" title="In fact, Alexa reports that far more people read this blog than visit either Representative&#8217;s site. And I happen to know from my internal site statistics that this blog gets only 50-80 visitors on a typical day.">7</a></small></sup> So, I ask: Do we have evidence that anybody actually reads these websites?</p>
<p>Druckman et al. would probably counter that it doesn&#8217;t matter whether anybody visits the site. What matters is that the site summarizes the campaign messages being used by the candidate generally, both online, in ads, and in appearances. Well&#8230;</p>
<p><em>Second: Do candidates actually push the same messages in the real world as in their websites?</em> You can fit many, many campaign messages into a website. You can only fit a small handful into a single ad, appearance, or mailer. Perhaps candidates intentionally place their most provocative messages on their websites to avoid having to say them to their opponent&#8217;s face during a debate. <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/23/AR2008092303099.html">We saw this in the 2008 presidential race</a>. Both presidential campaigns released their worst ads online only, knowing that the media would see them and relay the attack&#8217;s message to conflict-hungry viewers. This was a hands-off way for candidates to get negative messages out into the blogosphere without having to push the messages personally. If that happens in Congressional races too, then this study is flawed&#8211;perhaps deeply.</p>
<p>But again. I like the article. It makes a fabulous contribution. The authors do as most of us do, however, by overselling their point.</p>
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			<adano:pullquote><![CDATA[<div class="pullquote"><p>The authors have identified a cheap, easy way to capture a fuller sample of current campaign messages.</p></div>]]></adano:pullquote>
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		<title>Framing Public Opinion in Competitive Democracies</title>
		<link>http://abstractpolitics.com/2008/05/framing-public-opinion-in-competitive-democracies/</link>
		<comments>http://abstractpolitics.com/2008/05/framing-public-opinion-in-competitive-democracies/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 01 May 2008 20:31:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Adam Brown</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[American Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[campaign advertising]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[framing effects]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[media and politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[minimal effects]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[polarization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public opinion]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://abstractpolitics.com/?p=13</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In a democracy, politicians and policy outcomes should be responsive to changes in public opinion. But what if politicians (or others, such as media commentators) were able to manipulate public opinion through propaganda or other, more subtle methods? We might appear on the surface to have democracy, but it would be a farce. The public [...]]]></description>
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<p>In a democracy, politicians and policy outcomes should be responsive to changes in public opinion. But what if politicians (or others, such as media commentators) were able to manipulate public opinion through propaganda or other, more subtle methods? We might appear on the surface to have democracy, but it would be a farce. The public wouldn&#8217;t get the policies it wants; it would get the policies it was duped into wanting.</p>
<p>Political scientists have fretted over that possibility for decades. The first major findings found that mass media had &#8220;minimal effects&#8221; on public opinion.<sup class="footnote"><small><a href="http://abstractpolitics.com/2008/05/framing-public-opinion-in-competitive-democracies/#cite-8" name="cite-8" title="Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee. 1954. Voting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.">1</a></small></sup> More recently, scholars have found that political communications can influence opinion in a few ways. Of particular importance for this study, some scholars have reported that politicians and mass media can influence public opinion by choosing how to frame a story. Is protecting rainforests about indigenous rights or environmental concerns?<sup class="footnote"><small><a href="http://abstractpolitics.com/2008/05/framing-public-opinion-in-competitive-democracies/#cite-9" name="cite-9" title="On this issue, see Keck and Sikkink (1998).">2</a></small></sup> Are urban growth limits about protecting greenbelts or attracting greenbacks?<sup class="footnote"><small><a href="http://abstractpolitics.com/2008/05/framing-public-opinion-in-competitive-democracies/#cite-10" name="cite-10" title="Another example from some blog posts I&#8217;ve seen recently: Is climate change about saving the earth or saving on energy costs? One more, just for fun: How do we frame framing itself? Is it just &#8220;framing,&#8221; or is it &#8220;spin?&#8221;">3</a></small></sup></p>
<p>Chong and Druckman&#8217;s argument, in essence, is that previous studies have used methodologies that exaggerate the real-world importance of framing. Overwhelmingly, previous experiments have tested the effect of exposing people to a single frame (on one side of the issue) or none at all (the control group). These studies have found strong framing effects.</p>
<p>By contrast, Chong and Druckman develop two frames&#8211;one strong, one weak&#8211;on each side of their chosen issues, for a total of four frames.<span id="more-13"></span><sup class="footnote"><small><a href="http://abstractpolitics.com/2008/05/framing-public-opinion-in-competitive-democracies/#cite-11" name="cite-11" title="A frame&#8217;s strength was determined in pretests with a separate group of respondents, who were asked to list (open-endedly) all the considerations that came to mind when thinking about the hypothetical policy proposal presented to them. If fewer respondents listed a consideration, it was less &#8220;accessible,&#8221; therefore less strong. In one of the experiments, &#8220;strength&#8221; also referred to credibility; respondents saw the same editorial language, but attributed to either a respected newspaper or the high school paper.">4</a></small></sup> They randomly assign participants to receive some combination of these frames (or, in the control group, none of them). Some receive two frames on one side of the issue; some receive a strong frame on one side, a weak frame on the other side; some receive only a single frame; and some receive both frames on one side and one on the other.</p>
<p>This setup mirrors real political life more closely than the single-frame studies published previously, since real politics involve multiple actors seeking to promote their view. The most interesting and important conclusions:</p>
<ul>
<li>Strong frames move opinion significantly. Weak frames generally did not, with some exceptions.</li>
<li>A weak frame one one side opposed by a strong frame on the other produced a contrast effect; that is, respondents moved even closer to the strong frame&#8217;s view than if they had been exposed to only the strong frame. This effect was most pronounced among politically informed participants.</li>
<li>Competition between strong opposing frames has a moderating effect. Rather than reject the frame that discords with the respondent&#8217;s prior views, embracing only the concordant frame, the two frames interacted to pull respondents toward an intermediate position.</li>
</ul>
<p>The latter conclusion interested me most. With most contentious issues, there are at least two strong frames competing for recognition. In fact, the presence of two strong frames may be what makes an issue contentious in the first place. Studies that explore the effects of only a single frame, rather than examining competing frames, will therefore overstate the importance of frames.</p>
<p>This conclusion about moderation runs contrary to other recent research about polarization. In a literature summarized in <a href="http://www.amazon.com/True-Enough-Learning-Post-Fact-Society/dp/0470050101">Farhad Manjoo&#8217;s <em>True Enough</em></a><sup class="footnote"><small><a href="http://abstractpolitics.com/2008/05/framing-public-opinion-in-competitive-democracies/#cite-12" name="cite-12" title="From the blogosphere, here&#8217;s a review, and another.">5</a></small></sup>, other researchers have found that experiment participants will tend to accept uncritically arguments in favor of their prior view, while searching carefully for flaws in opposing arguments. It is unclear why Chong and Druckman found opposite results.</p>
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			<adano:pullquote><![CDATA[<div class="pullquote"><p>The public wouldn't get the policies it wants; it would get the policies it was duped into wanting.</p></div>]]></adano:pullquote>
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