Together, these two articles are a must-read. They help explain why genes and other biological factors might influence our political leanings. Biological factors (especially genetics) are the dominant cause of these Big Five personality traits, which then remain stable throughout life. In turn, these Big Five traits influence our political leanings (Gerber et al.) and our political activity (Mondak et al.).

The Big Five personality traits

Both articles adopt the “Big Five” approach that, they claim, has become widely accepted among psychologists. Quoting two psychologists, Gerber et al. sum up these big five traits as follows:

The Big Five - Gerber et al., pg 113

As Mondak et al. note, these Big Five traits are often summed up as OCEAN: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism (where neurotic is the opposite of emotionally stable).

Effects of personality on ideology

Gerber et al. argue that these Big Five personality traits influence our political leanings. Each trait may have different effects on our economic ideology (free market vs interventionist) as well as on our social ideology (pro-choice/pro-equality vs pro-life/pro-tradition). They expect four of the five traits to influence ideology. The only exception is extroversion, which they expect to influence political participation (as Mondak et al. show) but not ideology. Their predictions:

Using a very large sample drawn from the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP), the authors confirm most of these predictions. I’ve pasted below their Figure 1. All hypotheses are confirmed. Their only error was in predicting that emotional stability would cause folks to lean left on social issues. As it turns out, emotionally stable folks lean right on both dimensions and neurotic folks lean left on both dimensions. So we learn that Conservatives are hard-working, organized, closed-minded, and emotionally stable. Liberals are lazy, disorganized, open-minded, and neurotic. Let’s see how the punditocracy spins that one. The effects of personality rival the effects of education and income.

Figure 1 from Gerber et al. 2010

Contextual effects

Gerber et al. also argue that these effects can be contextual, although they seem less committed to this possibility than Mondak et al, for whom environmental interactions were a critical part of the story. In particular, they argue that race might matter. For example, blacks tend to view poverty as caused by systematic forces rather than by laziness; as such, conscientiousness may have a weaker pull among blacks toward economic liberalism. Likewise, blacks tend to be surrounded by liberalism; thus, “openness” might actually lead blacks to question the liberalism that surrounds them rather than pulling them toward the left. Gerber et al. find support for these contextual interactions with a series of figures like the one below. When I look at these figures, though, it doesn’t look so much like an interaction to me–rather, it looks like it’s just harder to predict ideology using personality among blacks than it is among whites.

Figure 2a from Gerber et al 2010

Comment and Criticism

This article, together with the similar one by Mondak et al., is a must-read. I’m not sure whether I’m persuaded yet that I need to demand a personality index on every poll I work with. But these two articles introduce us to a new psychological approach that I’m sure we’ll see much more of.

More accurately, we don’t know which “why” is the real “why.” Folks who have published evidence of these perceptual biases have also offered lots of different reasons for them, and we have yet to see research that sorts those various reasons out.

In the current issue of AJPS, Gerber and Huber write an article that claims to do exactly that: Test the possible explanations of these perceptual biases against one another. At least, that’s what you would think their article does after reading the introduction. Once you get into it, you find that they really only test two of the possible theories against each other. The remaining theories that have been suggested go untested, meaning they may or may not be true.

Briefly, these are the six theories that have been given to explain why Republicans and Democrats rate the economy differently. I use boldface to indicate Gerber and Huber’s preferred label for each theory:

• Endogenous partisanship (i.e. reverse causation). Perhaps people shift their partisan leanings over time as they observe how each party manages the economy.²
• Divergent criteria. Perhaps voters evaluate Democratic-led governments on a different basis than they evaluate Republican-led governments (e.g. giving greater weight to unemployment relative to inflation).
• Partisan cheerleading. Maybe Democrats just like to cheer on Democratic-led governments by claiming that the economy is doing better when Democrats are in power.
• Selective exposure. Maybe Democrats and Republicans experience different economic realities (e.g. work in different sectors) or read different newspapers.
• Selected perception. Maybe Democrats and Republicans mentally screen out negative information about their party while uncritically accepting positive information.³
• Partisan perceptions (i.e. beliefs about confidence). Maybe voters believe that their party’s politicians are more competent at managing the economy, so they assume the economy will perform better when their party is in power. The logic here is very different from “endogenous partisanship”; see below. (This is Gerber and Huber’s preferred theory.)

Method and results

Gerber and Huber do not test all of these theories. Rather, they design a test that holds all of these possible mechanisms constant except two: Partisan cheerleading and partisan perceptions. They use CCES interviews from immediately before and immediately after the 2006 Congressional elections, which produce a surprise turnover of both the House and the Senate from the Republicans to the Democrats.

These pre- and post-election interviews were only a few weeks apart. During that time, not much changed in the real economy (as measured by stock prices, oil prices, inflation, unemployment, and so on) or in the reported economy (based on a comparison of NY Times and Wall Street Journal economic coverage). As such, Gerber and Huber argue (persuasively) that divergent criteria, selective exposure, and selective perception cannot explain any differences in the pre- and post-election interviews. To control for the “endogenous partisanship” theory, they use a panel of the same respondents for both interviews, enabling them to hold partisanship constant across the two waves.

These methods leave only two theories capable of explaining any shift in respondent evaluations of the national economy that occurred between the pre- and post-interviews: Cheerleading and partisan perceptions. Let’s be clear here: Of the 6 possible causal mechanisms that Gerber and Huber identify, they test only 2 of them.

They argue that they can differentiate between these last two theories by looking at two sets of dependent variables. Either theory would predict that respondents would adjust their perceptions of the national economy in a partisan manner following the election: Democrats would become more optimistic, Republicans would become less optimistic. But for reasons that aren’t entirely clear to me, Gerber and Huber argue that only the “partisan perceptions” theory would also predict that respondents would adjust their nonpolitical perceptions (e.g. general level of happiness, expected level of Christmas/vacation spending).

Sure enough, Gerber and Huber find that Democrats became much more optimistic about the national economy in the post-election survey; Republicans did the opposite. But they also found that Democrats became more optimistic about their personal lives. Because of that latter finding, they conclude that “partisan cheerleading” does not explain the results, but “partisan perceptions” does.

What it means

Here’s what they say it means:

… partisanship leads to a general attribution of desirable traits to those who share one’s partisanship (Conover and Feldman 1982). A similar phenomenon emerges in psychology research, in which individuals are prone to falsely attribute unobserved positive qualities to individuals whom share characteristics with them while falsely attributing unobserved negative qualities to individuals whom they do not feel warmly toward. While there is no doubt that some citizens have sophisticated and deeply held views about economic policy…, for many Americans, there is no rational basis to suppose that one party is better than the other at managing the economy. If such positive or negative traits are attributed to the parties nonetheless, it could generate the patterns of economic assessments and behaviors observed here.

Take that, Anthony Downs.

Parting shots

I have trouble with this claim: “For many Americans, there is no rational basis to suppose that one party is better than the other at managing the economy.” If that’s true, is our entire democratic process a farce? We can probably all agree that Democrats prefer more government services while Republicans are torn between wanting low taxes and wanting a ridiculously large defense budget. If nothing else, don’t those decisions about tax rates and government spending influence the economy in some way?

At the same time, I don’t question their broader point at all. It seems downright likely that a voter would tend to think more highly of a politician’s capabilities for the simple reason that the voter and politician are on the same “team.” (Case in point: The Robber’s Cave experiment.)

So I’m left wondering: Can’t we have both? Isn’t it possible that parties do manage the economy differently, and also that voters have biased beliefs about each party’s capabilities?

I’m also a bit disappointed by the bait and switch in this article. The authors had me expecting a test of all 6 theories listed above. Instead, they tested only two, confirming one and weakly rejecting the other. But although the scope of this article isn’t as broad as the authors pitch it as, the article is nevertheless excellent. The methods are precise and enable an accurate test of two theories. Let’s hope that future research can do just as good a job of testing the other possible theories.

In an article by Gerber, Green, and Larimer, these three political scientists report the result of a large-scale randomized experiment involving 180,000 Michigan voters.¹ You may not know it, but several states (including Michigan) make it a matter of public record whether or not you vote. Anybody willing to pay a small access fee can have a list of registered voters, including names, addresses, and turnout information.²

Once you’ve got this information, designing an experiment is easy. First, find out who has voted in recent elections and who hasn’t. Then, apply some sort of treatment to a randomly selected group of these people. Finally, observe turnout in a future election and see whether the treated group increased its turnout.

What the Researchers Did

That’s the pattern the authors followed. They acquired this turnout information for 180,000 voters, then divided them into a control group (with 100,000 members) and four treatment groups (with 20,000 voters each). These five groups were all similar in terms of household size, gender balance, average age, and average turnout over the previous few elections. The general question was this: Can we come up with a “treatment” that will cause a treated group to vote at significantly higher levels than the untreated control group?

The four treatments were designed to play on our sense that voting is a civic duty. There’s an internal and an external side to civic duty. The internal side represents the positive “warm fuzzies” that you might feel inside if you fulfill your duty by voting. The external side represents the negative social shame you might feel from others if you fail to vote.

Treatment #1 was a simple postcard with a gentle reminder to recipients that voting is a duty, so they should participate in the upcoming primary election. Treatment #2 added a note that researchers were watching this election to learn about turnout (to control for any Hawthorne effects). Treatment #3 removed this research note, but added a reminder “that who votes is a matter of public record,” with the recipient’s turnout behavior over the past couple elections written below; following was an ominous reminder that “we intend to mail you an updated chart” after the primary, indicating whether you voted.

Treatment #4 was the doozy. At the top, in capital letters, was the question, “What if your neighbors knew whether you voted?” After a brief explanation, the mailer displayed the turnout record for the recipient and all the recipient’s neighbors. This is the sort of mailer that causes new cases of paranoid schizophrenia. If you’re not picturing what this mailer would have looked like, take a look at this sample (from the article’s appendix; click on the image to enlarge it):

What the Researchers Found

Treatment #1 yielded a turnout rate 1.8 percentage points higher than the control group’s. Previous researchers have tried things similar to treatment #1 and found similar results. Treatment #2 raised turnout 2.5 points relative to the control. Treatment #3 raised it 4.9 relative to the control. These are large changes.

But treatment #4 raised turnout by a whopping 8.1 percentage points from the control.

Let’s put that in perspective. In other experiments, the greatest boost in turnout came when experimenters sent door-to-door canvassers. The effect of these “social pressure” mailings was roughly the same as sending somebody to the voter’s door. However, it was far more cost effective. Canvassing costs roughly $20 per vote, while these mailers cost roughly $1.93 per vote.³ Of course, that doesn’t mean political consultants should jump on this new tactic; many recipients of treatment #4 called the number listed on the mailer to complain.

So what does this all mean?

It means two things. First, it means that there is a substantial internal “civic duty” motivation that gets people to vote. Sure, they might vote because they care about the outcome, or because they think their vote matters for the outcome. But (as treatment #1 shows) they also vote because they want the internal “warm fuzzies” of voting.

Second, there is an even stronger external “civic duty” motivation. Social shame matters, and in a big way. This sense of (external) civic duty gets activated when people know that others can observe their behavior. Shame works. The authors seem almost surprised by this finding. The psychological and sociological literatures warn of “reactance” when heavy-handed tactics are used to enforce norm compliance–so the authors seem to have half expected turnout to fall among group #4. But instead of reactance, they saw a large rise in compliance.

Most precincts give out those little “I voted” stickers to encourage people to vote, presumably to tap into these social rewards. If we really want to improve turnout, maybe the government should start mailing out postcards similar to treatment #4 before (and after) every election!