Framing Public Opinion in Competitive Democracies

May 1, 2008 – 1:31 pm
This is a review of Framing Public Opinion in Competitive Democracies. Chong, Dennis and James N. Druckman. 2007. American Political Science Review 101 (November): 637-656. Find in Google Scholar

The public wouldn’t get the policies it wants; it would get the policies it was duped into wanting.

In a democracy, politicians and policy outcomes should be responsive to changes in public opinion. But what if politicians (or others, such as media commentators) were able to manipulate public opinion through propaganda or other, more subtle methods? We might appear on the surface to have democracy, but it would be a farce. The public wouldn’t get the policies it wants; it would get the policies it was duped into wanting.

Political scientists have fretted over that possibility for decades. The first major findings found that mass media had “minimal effects” on public opinion.1 More recently, scholars have found that political communications can influence opinion in a few ways. Of particular importance for this study, some scholars have reported that politicians and mass media can influence public opinion by choosing how to frame a story. Is protecting rainforests about indigenous rights or environmental concerns?2 Are urban growth limits about protecting greenbelts or attracting greenbacks?3

Chong and Druckman’s argument, in essence, is that previous studies have used methodologies that exaggerate the real-world importance of framing. Overwhelmingly, previous experiments have tested the effect of exposing people to a single frame (on one side of the issue) or none at all (the control group). These studies have found strong framing effects.

By contrast, Chong and Druckman develop two frames–one strong, one weak–on each side of their chosen issues, for a total of four frames. Read More »

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Effects of “In-Your-Face” Television Discourse on Perceptions of a Legitimate Opposition

April 30, 2008 – 5:23 pm
This is a review of Effects of “In-Your-Face” Television Discourse on Perceptions of a Legitimate Opposition. Mutz, Diana C. 2007. American Political Science Review 101 (November): 621-636. Find in Google Scholar

Do we truly believe that ALL red-state residents are ignorant racist fascist knuckle-dragging NASCAR-obsessed cousin-marrying road-kill-eating tobacco-juice-dribbling gun-fondling religious fanatic rednecks; or that ALL blue-state residents are godless unpatriotic pierced-nose Volvo-driving France-loving left-wing Communist latte-sucking tofu-chomping holistic-wacko neurotic vegan weenie perverts?1

With that opening quotation from Dave Barry, Mutz introduces her central question: How do Americans form their opinions about their political opponents? Why can some Americans agree to disagree with their “worthy opposition” while others dismiss their political opponents as irrational lunatics?2 Numerous previous studies have asked how Americans form their personal political preferences, but Mutz asks a new question. To answer it, Mutz looks carefully at the effects of political television.

In carefully crafted experiments, Mutz examines the effects of two features of political television: Its use of extreme closeups on a speaker’s face rather than on more comfortable upper-body shots, and its tendency to broadcast uncivil shouting matches instead of civil debates. Her experiments feature two actors posing as Congressional candidates, with their debate filmed twice: Both use the same script, but the uncivil one adds rude body language (eyerolling) and sarcastic asides (”You have completely missed the point here!”). Both are filmed simultaneously from both close-up and medium camera perspectives, resulting in a 2×2 treatment matrix.

As it turns out, these two variables interact to influence our attitudes about whichever “candidate” we disagree with. Mutz arrives at three primary conclusions: Read More »

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Challenger Entry and Voter Learning

April 30, 2008 – 9:59 am
This is a review of Challenger Entry and Voter Learning. Gordon, Sanford C., Gregory A. Huber, and Dimitri Landa. 2007. American Political Science Review 2 (May): 303-320. Find in Google Scholar

Democracy is supposed to provide voters with an opportunity to hold elected officials accountable for their performance in office. With so many elected officials to monitor, however, voters would have a difficult time fulfilling this task without assistance.

Previous research has indicated that experienced, high-quality candidates are more likely to challenge Congressional incumbents when there is evidence that the incumbent is vulnerable. This makes sense; running for office is costly, both in terms of time, money, and reputation, so why should a potential candidate incur these costs if the odds of success are low? If the incumbent has experienced some scandal, or if the incumbent’s party as a whole is unpopular, the odds of victory increase–and so we see higher-quality candidates willing to incur the costs of running. This logic explains why some incumbents face political neophytes, while others experience formidable, experienced, well-funded challengers.

Gordon and his colleagues take this widely accepted argument a step further. Their concern lies not with the candidates’ thinking, but with the voters’. If, as previous research indicates, high-quality challengers act strategically when deciding whether to run against a Congressional incumbent, then this decision ought to convey important information to voters.

As long as voters believe that the challenger actually bears the sort of costs discussed in the literature, Read More »

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Candidate Quality, the Personal Vote, and the Incumbency Advantage in Congress

April 30, 2008 – 9:22 am
This is a review of Candidate Quality, the Personal Vote, and the Incumbency Advantage in Congress. Carson, Jamie L., Erik J. Engstrom, and Jason M. Roberts. 2007. American Political Science Review 100 (May): 289-301. Find in Google Scholar

If democracy requires rotation in power, then the American Congress may not be all that democratic. In 1998, 2000, and 2002, over ninety-six percent of House incumbents who have sought reelection have won. These facts are clear.1

What is less clear is the source of this incumbency advantage. Previous research has suggested three answers. First, perhaps the perks of office, particularly the franking privilege and opportunities for casework, allow incumbents to endear themselves to their constitutions (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977). Second, perhaps gerrymanding and weakened party loyalty are to blame (Erikson 1972). Or third, perhaps incumbents are so formidable that the best potential challengers simply refuse to invest their time running (Cox and Katz 1996; 2000).2

The trouble with these theories is that they have been developed and tested in the post-World War II context. The authors look to historical (1870-1900) House elections for further illumination. In so doing, they cast doubt on the first two theories, both of which claim that factors present today (but absent in the nineteenth century) cause the incumbency advantage. As it turns out, there was an incumbency advantage even then, even before members of Congress had large staffs (for casework), the frank, high salaries, and constant redistricting.

The authors then turn to the third theory. Read More »

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